(Translation) 陳時務箚 - 편집 역사

Lotus: /* Original Script */

2022-02-14T16:17:56Z

‎Original Script

Lotus: /* Original Script */

2022-02-14T16:16:45Z

‎Original Script

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2022년 2월 14일 (월) 15:43에 Lotus님의 편집

2022-02-14T15:43:31Z

Jaeyoon.song: /* Original Script */

2021-11-14T12:55:55Z

‎Original Script

Jaeyoon.song: /* Original Script */

2021-11-14T12:55:00Z

‎Original Script

Jaeyoon.song: /* Introduction */

2021-11-14T12:54:07Z

‎Introduction

Jaeyoon.song: /* Original Script */

2021-11-14T12:53:22Z

‎Original Script

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Jaeyoon.song: /* Introduction */

2021-11-14T12:50:47Z

‎Introduction

Jaeyoon.song: /* Introduction */

2021-11-14T12:50:15Z

‎Introduction

2020년 2월 25일 (화) 14:50에 Jaeyoon.song님의 편집

2020-02-25T14:50:36Z

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 {|class="wikitable" style="width:100%; font-size:110%; color:#002080; background-color:#ffffff;"
-!style="width:30%; vertical-align:top; "|Classical Chinese || style="width:70%;"| English
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@@ 313번째 줄: / 313번째 줄: @@
 # Some argue that nationalism (or proto-nationalism) in Korea was shaped during the Hideyoshi Invasion in its collective process of fending off Japanese. Is there any part in this document that evidences the existence of (proto-)nationalism in Korea?
 # Scholars like JaHyun Kim Haboush have argued that the spontaneous resistance organized by the righteous army marked the beginning of a prototype Korean nationalism. How is Ryu Seong-ryong’s assessment of the righteous army compare to this view?
 <div style="color:#008080;">
 * View together with '''[[Record of Property Distribution among Brothers from 1621]]'''.
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--->
+*
+*
+-->
 =='''References'''==
 <references/>
+<!--
 =='''Translation'''==
@@ 708번째 줄: / 708번째 줄: @@
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@@ 239번째 줄: / 239번째 줄: @@
 -8. This minister thinks that the military forces for retrieval of the capital should be divided into three routes. The troops of Yangju, Pocheon, Jeokseon, Yongpyeong, Gapyeong and other counties would be under the command of one general. Like General Go Eonbaek, they will block the eastern frontiers.
 京城收復之勢, 臣意亦當分爲三道. 楊州，抱川，積城，永平，加平等邑之軍, 則屬於一將,如高彦伯者, 遮蔽東方.
 -9. The military garrisons in Gyodong, Ganghwa, Goyang, Gyoha, and others should also under the command of one general so that they can surround and guard [the capital] from four different directions. The military garrisons to the south of the Han River such as Gwangju, Gwachoen, Suwoen and other places  should also be under the command of one general so that they can block [the roads] from the south.
 喬桐，江華，高陽，交河等邑之軍, 又屬於一將, 遮蔽西方. 漢江以南廣州，果川，水原等諸邑之軍, 又屬於一將, 遮蔽南面.
 -10. These troops of the three regions should be merged to subdue the enemies in alternation. When the number of the bandits is small, we should divide the troops and have some lie in ambush. When they are in large numbers, we should fight with all our troops in unison. Moreover, the high-ranking officials should routinely patrol and inspect the situation so that the righteous army [private militia] and the official troops would not dissipate in conflict with each other. Whether they advance or retreat, they would be united as one. Only by then, the conditions of our troops would be vibrant and magnificent, and we should defeat the enemies.

← 이전 판		2021년 11월 14일 (일) 12:55 판
213번째 줄:		213번째 줄:


−	<A new translation by Jaeyoon Song>	+	'''<A new translation by Jaeyoon Song>'''
		+

	1-1. [The Great Lord of Pungwon, your Minister humbly considers] the state-of-affairs today has already become extremely dangerous and urgent. There is nothing more we can do. Every day we look towards the Ming Army [lit. Tang troops], but they procrastinate and do not come. The year is coming closer to the end. Our country has expressed the utmost loyalty toward the Central Country. The reason why we had to undergo this catastrophe is partly because of the Central Country. The Central Country does not swiftly come to our rescue; as a result, it intensifies the chaos of the world. If there are [talented] people in the Central Country who can cope with these matters, things would not have become like this for sure.		1-1. [The Great Lord of Pungwon, your Minister humbly considers] the state-of-affairs today has already become extremely dangerous and urgent. There is nothing more we can do. Every day we look towards the Ming Army [lit. Tang troops], but they procrastinate and do not come. The year is coming closer to the end. Our country has expressed the utmost loyalty toward the Central Country. The reason why we had to undergo this catastrophe is partly because of the Central Country. The Central Country does not swiftly come to our rescue; as a result, it intensifies the chaos of the world. If there are [talented] people in the Central Country who can cope with these matters, things would not have become like this for sure.

@@ 28번째 줄: / 28번째 줄: @@
 '''
-Written by Jaeyoon Song (McMaster University)
+Written
 Ryu Seong-ryong was a prolific memorial (zhouyi 奏議) writer. Throughout his long career as a highest-ranking minister of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1897), Ryu Seong-ryong had left more than five hundred memorials. Each of memorial offers a precious window into the official decision-making processes in the innermost circle of the royal court. To understand the roles and responsibilities Ryu Seong-ryong assumed as a wartime premier, we should carefully read his memorials and interpret their implications in historical context. In this article, I will provide an English translation of one of the memorials Ryu drafted in the eleventh month of 1592, seven months after the outbreak of the Imjin War (1592-1598).

@@ 26번째 줄: / 26번째 줄: @@
 '''“Risky and Urgent”: An Annotated Translation of Ryu Seong-ryong’s 柳成龍(1542-1607) “A Memorial Discussing the Crucial Tasks of the Moment” (陳時務箚)
-Jaeyoon Song (McMaster University)'''
+'''
 Ryu Seong-ryong was a prolific memorial (zhouyi 奏議) writer. Throughout his long career as a highest-ranking minister of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1897), Ryu Seong-ryong had left more than five hundred memorials. Each of memorial offers a precious window into the official decision-making processes in the innermost circle of the royal court. To understand the roles and responsibilities Ryu Seong-ryong assumed as a wartime premier, we should carefully read his memorials and interpret their implications in historical context. In this article, I will provide an English translation of one of the memorials Ryu drafted in the eleventh month of 1592, seven months after the outbreak of the Imjin War (1592-1598).

← 이전 판		2021년 11월 14일 (일) 12:50 판
24번째 줄:		24번째 줄:

	=='''Introduction'''==		=='''Introduction'''==
		+
		+	'''“Risky and Urgent”: An Annotated Translation of Ryu Seong-ryong’s 柳成龍(1542-1607) “A Memorial Discussing the Crucial Tasks of the Moment” (陳時務箚)
		+	Jaeyoon Song (McMaster University)'''
		+
		+	Ryu Seong-ryong was a prolific memorial (zhouyi 奏議) writer. Throughout his long career as a highest-ranking minister of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1897), Ryu Seong-ryong had left more than five hundred memorials. Each of memorial offers a precious window into the official decision-making processes in the innermost circle of the royal court. To understand the roles and responsibilities Ryu Seong-ryong assumed as a wartime premier, we should carefully read his memorials and interpret their implications in historical context. In this article, I will provide an English translation of one of the memorials Ryu drafted in the eleventh month of 1592, seven months after the outbreak of the Imjin War (1592-1598).
		+	At the time, the Joseon court moved to Jeongju 定州 in refuge, more than three hundred kilometers away from the royal palace in the capital. Starting from the sixth month of 1592, Ryu was placed in charge of receiving the Ming troops. To facilitate the entry of the Ming troops to the Korean peninsula, Ryu had regularly made his rounds to the Jeongju and Anju regions in Pyeongan Province. Therefore, it would be safe to assume that Ryu Seong-ryong obtain the first-hand knowledge of those areas in question. What can we learn from this memorial drafted by Ryu in the early phase of the Imjin War? Before attempting an answer to this question, let us think about the significant place of memorial in East Asian history in general.
		+
		+	'''Memorials as State Documents in East Asian History'''
		+
		+	In traditional East Asia, statesmen and scholars routinely composed memorials (zhouyi 奏議) and submitted them to the highest authority of their countries, emperors in China or kings in Korea or Vietnam, through the official channels of bureaucratic communication. Those who wrote memorials could be ministers, administrators, scholars, educators, local literati, and even commoners. Memorials could be of many different types and in diverse forms. All these memorials have one thing in common: without an exception, the addressor of a memorial is “this minister (chen 臣)” or “your minister” and the addressee, their sovereign on top.
		+
		+	In memorials, the writers would generally point out chronic problems or urgent issues in government, inquire into those problems, suggest institutional alternatives, construct rational arguments in favor of their policy proposals, etc. By writing memorials, traditional intellectuals could participate in the process of building, remedying, and restructuring the basic institutions of the state. Sometimes they would also construct highly argumentative essays on purely academic, ethical, philosophical, or even cosmological questions with reference to the Confucian Classics. For such reasons, memorials could be considered the most serious, carefully written, and solemn statements Confucian literati could make in their lifetimes on the most urgent and significant issues of government. Sometimes they were called upon by the state to submit their ideas on a particular issue; sometimes they chose voluntarily to express their visions and propose their plans for the state.
		+	Formally, as noted above, the ultimate audience of memorials was the sovereign of the state; however, both in Chinese and Korean dynasties, contemporary memorials were also open to the public: they were not only circulated but also studied in-depth by the literati themselves. Obviously for this reason, a set of memorials often had the pride of place at the very beginning of their literary collections. The official histories of the traditional state in East Asia, especially the dynastic chronicles (biannian 編年), generally present a series of memorials and official responses by the sovereign and his ministers at the court. The memorials recorded were generally submitted by ministers, field administrators, and renowned scholars. Through the writing of memorials, the elite could propose their policy plans and institutional alternatives; they could thereby participate in the decision-making processes of the court. In other words, they were the institution-builders of their own states, and they influenced court politics through the means of memorial-writing.
		+
		+	Ma Duanlin’s 馬端臨 (ca. 1254-1323) Comprehensive Survey of Literary Remains (Wenxin tongkao 文獻通考) was one of the most important sources showing cumulative debates on state institutions throughout history down to the late Southern Song (1127-1279). This work is no more than a topically arranged systematic compilation of cumulative memorials drafted and proposed by statesmen and scholars, often ending with Ma Duanlin’s own comments on each topic. Ma Duanlin presents the long continuous process of institution-building throughout the successive dynasties in Chinese history through the prism of memorials. In this picture, statesmen and scholars who bothered to compose memorials on state institutions such as land taxes, personnel recruitment, civil examinations, assessment, monetary policy, etc., were the heroes of history because their writings made possible the institutional evolution of the state.
		+
		+	In Korean history, we can find another good example showing how the genre of memorial was used by a scholar for articulation of his grand political visions: though not emphasized in recent scholarship, we should not forget that Jeong Yak-yong’s 丁若鏞 (1762-1836) magnum opus, Gyeongse yupyo 經世遺表 was a systematically arranged set of memorials he had composed with the king as the ultimate audience in mind. “Yupyo” here literally means the last memorials of a minister. With the urgency of uttering the last words on earth, Jeong Yak-yong wrote a series of memorials calling on the king to initiate a fundamental reformation of state institutions.
		+
		+
		+	'''Ryu Seong-ryong’s Call for State-Making in War
		+	'''
		+	“A Memorial Discussing the Crucial Tasks of the Moment” was written in refuge by one of the highest-ranking ministers who had witnessed the total collapse of order. It is a striking example showing how court decisions were made at an extreme moment of crisis. At the time, the sweeping invasion of the country by Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (豊臣秀吉, 1537-1598) troops “had completely depleted the energy of the state organization and the populace alike from Sun’an to Yongcheon,” according to Ryu Seong-ryong. The two urgent things undermining the state’s power to fight the war were the loss of grains to the Japanese troops and the moral hazards of the Joseon troops. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Ryu Seong-ryong called on the king to do three things at once: to explain the situation to the Ming generals, to procure military provisions for their troops, and, most importantly, to appease the minds of the people struggling for survival during the devastating war.
		+
		+	Based on a close observation of the local social-economic conditions, Ryu Seong-ryong proposes to abolish all the ill-conceived practices of the government. He argues that the most important task for the court in war was to muster popular support for the dynasty. The chronic problems of the Joseon state, which had been hidden from view in times of peace, erupted all at once when hard hit by the war. Oddly enough, even those who fought and captured alive the enemies were sometimes imprisoned because of the discrepancy in the number of captives reported. Without abolishing the impractical customs of the Joseon state, Ryu Seong-ryong laments, the dynastic altar could not be protected. In this memorial, we can see that Ryu Seong-ryong follows the long-standing tradition of memorial writings: he diagnoses the root causes of the Joseon state in war based on a close survey of the real conditions of society, analyzes the reasons for the rampancy of ill-conceived practices, and proposes the hands-on solutions for those problems.
		+
		+	Ryu Seong-ryong proposes that the king should win “the people’s hearts (insim 人心)” through the official recognition of their heroic behaviors and contributions. “The people’s hearts,” employed by Ryu, does not simply mean the popular sentiment of the time, but their sense of belonging to the state and their loyalty toward the dynasty. How the state conceived of them did not matter as much as how they thought of the state.
		+
		+	As is generally known, a large number of people in the Korean peninsula at the time were not the legitimate members of the Josen state. This was the period in which 30-40 % of the whole population were registered as nobi 奴婢 (slaves) of Yangban families. In other words, they were treated as properties or chattels of other people; through the lawful transactions certified by the state, slaves could be purchased, bartered, inherited, and yielded. In world historical perspective, Joseon slavery was of the worst form of deterior conducio: according this principle, when either of the parents is a slave, a child inherits the slave status. By gaining “the people’s hearts,” Ryu Seong-ryong suggests that the state should recognize those people in bondage not as properties of other people but as the legitimate population of the state. Although he does not go so far as to call for the abolition of the nobi system itself, Ryu considers it necessary to enroll the unregistered population such as a large group of hunters living in the mountains in Gangwon Province as the people of the Josen state. In war with the Japanese troops, Ryu Seong-ryong found it inevitable to expediate the process of state-making. In this light, this memorial in question is an invaluable source that shows not only the real conditions of people living in Joseon society, but also the level of statehood achieved at the time.
		+	Without further ado, let us venture into the wartime archipelago of the late fifteen century Joseon state, as described by the hands of a most skilled memorial writer based on a close observation of the most destructive war in the whole of Korean history up to that point.

	=='''Original Script'''==		=='''Original Script'''==

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 |Type =
 |Author = [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryu_Seong-ryong 西厓 柳成龍]
-|Year = 1594
+|Year = 1592
 |Key Concepts=  Imjin War, Japan-Korea Relations
 |Translator = [[2017 Summer Hanmun Workshop (Advanced)#수강생 | Participants of 2017 Summer Hanmun Workshop (Advanced Translation Group)]]
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 <gallery>
-파일:진시무차2.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1594(2)
+파일:진시무차2.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1592(2)
-파일:진시무차3.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1594(3)
+파일:진시무차3.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1592(3)
-파일:진시무차4.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1594(4)
+파일:진시무차4.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1592(4)
-파일:진시무차5.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1594(5)
+파일:진시무차5.JPG|* 陳時務箚 진시무차(''Jin simucha'') 1592(5)
 </gallery>